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Abstract 
In response to the need expressed by the UN General Assembly, an economic vulnerability index 
(EVI) has been defined by the Committee for Development Policy. The present paper, which 
refers to this index, first examines how a structural economic vulnerability index can be designed 
for the low-income countries in particular. It recalls the conceptual and empirical grounds of the 
index, considers the structure of the present EVI, its sensitivity to methodological choices with 
respect to averaging, as well as related possible improvements, and briefly compares the levels 
and trends of EVI in various country groups, using a new database from a ‘retrospective EVI’. 
The paper examines how EVI can be used for international development policy, underlining two 
main purposes: first—the purpose for which EVI was initially designed—is the identification of 
the least developed countries (LDCs) that are allowed to receive some preferential treatment in aid 
and trade matters. EVI, in addition to income per capita and human capital, is one of the three 
complementary criteria a country needs to meet in order to be perceived as a LDC, and 
consequently it cannot be the sole criterion for countries wishing to avoid exiting the LDC list. 
And second, EVI is to be used, in addition to other traditional measures, as a criterion for aid 
allocation between developing countries. We argue that such an inclusion is legitimate for both 
reasons of effectiveness and equity. The two purposes are presented as complementary. 
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The Design of an Economic Vulnerability Index and its Use for International 
Development Policy  
1 Introduction 
Economic vulnerability of developing countries is not really a new issue. If we consider the 
development literature of forty years ago, the issue of instability, especially for primary 
exports and international prices, made up a significant part in the analysis of the problems 
faced by developing countries. Recently, the economic vulnerability of developing countries 
again has appeared to be high on the international agenda, even higher now with the 
occurrence of the world economic turmoil.  
Several trends and events may have contributed to this renewed interest in macro vulnerability 
in the last decade. The unsustainability of growth episodes in Africa has become a major 
intellectual and political challenge. In particular, the problem of conflicts, acute in Africa, has 
drawn the attention of the international community to the risk of civil wars, often lasting or 
recurrent. It is mainly in reference to these situations and other possible sources of collapse 
that new concepts—such as ‘LICUS’ (low-income countries under stress) or ‘fragile states’—
have emerged. These concepts, however, differ significantly from economic vulnerability, as 
will be shown below.  
Moreover, in the second part of the 1990s, the ‘Asian crisis’ underlined the vulnerability of 
some emerging countries which had registered before the crisis a high level of capital inflows 
with a weak financial structure. This led several authors to assess the risk of a financial crisis, 
a measure of vulnerability, but one that also differs from the vulnerability of low-income 
countries considered below. It is also to be noted that the concern over the instability of 
international commodity prices has become deeper due to their possible greater impact on 
producers in a context of liberalized domestic agricultural markets. Initiatives have been made 
to propose ways in which commodity-dependent economies can better manage the risks they 
face in a market-based approach. And more generally, the attention focused on vulnerability 
at the household level that has emerged in connection with poverty-related research, has also 
reinforced interest on macro-level vulnerability because vulnerability of households results to 
a large extent from macro vulnerability. 
Two main factors have not only contributed to the growing concern over macro vulnerability, 
but have also prompted the search for a vulnerability index, which could be comparable 
across countries and could likely be used in designing international development policies. 
These correspond to the international concern regarding the structural features of specific 
country-groups, and have been voiced in various United Nations meetings and resolutions. 
Two groups of countries thus have been considered with respect to vulnerability. The first 
group, and the only official one, is the category of the least developed countries (LDCs), set 
up by the UN General Assembly in 1971. The second, a more informal group, is ‘small island 
developing states’ (SIDS). On the part of both groups, there is a need to be able to assess the 
vulnerability of these countries through an appropriate indicator. 
First, the SIDS have repeatedly expressed a concern about their level of vulnerability, as 
voiced at the 1994 Barbados Conference on Sustainable Development of Small Island 
Developing States. Following this Conference that called for ‘the development of 
vulnerability indices and other indicators that reflect the status of small island developing 
countries and integrate ecological fragility and economic vulnerability’, the UN General 
Assembly requested in 1996 the Secretary General to prepare a report on the vulnerability 
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index and the Committee for Development Planning (CDP) to examine this index. In 1998, 
the UN Commission on Sustainable Development urged the CDP to present its findings and 
for other UN bodies to accord priority to the work on the vulnerability of SIDS. In 1999, after 
considering several available indicators, the Committee for Development Policy (the CDP 
renamed) proposed a new and relatively simple index (UN 1999) which was elaborated 
further at the following CDP sessions. Ten years after the Barbados Conference, the Mauritius 
Conference (December 2004) reiterated the concern of the international community about the 
vulnerability of small islands. Few days later, the tsunami confirmed the relevance of this 
concern. 
Second, in accordance with CDP’s own suggestion, the General Assembly requested the 
committee to consider ‘the usefulness of the vulnerability index as a criterion for the 
designation of the least developed countries’. Since the category was established, the LDCs 
have been considered as low-income countries suffering from structural handicaps to growth. 
Initially, in addition to the level of income per capita, the criteria used to capture structural 
shortcomings were the literacy rate and the share of manufacturing in GDP. These were 
replaced in 1991 by two composite indices, one referring to human status, the other to 
economic diversification. In 1999, as noted above, the CDP proposed that in addition to the 
level of GDP per capita and an index of human capital, the new economic vulnerability index 
(EVI) should replace the diversification index as one of the criteria for identifying LDCs. In 
2000 at its triennial review of the LDCs list, CDP implemented the EVI index as an 
identification criterion, utilizing it again in 2003 and 2006 with some revisions. This new 
vulnerability criterion, initial and revised versions, has been recognized by ECOSOC. 
The economic vulnerability of a country can be defined by the risk of a (poor) country seeing 
its development hampered by the natural or external shocks it faces. Here we consider two 
main kinds of exogenous shocks, thus two main sources of vulnerability: (i) environmental or 
‘natural’ shocks, namely natural disasters such as earthquakes or volcanic eruptions, and the 
more frequent climatic shocks such as typhoons and hurricanes, droughts, floods, etc., and (ii) 
external (trade- and exchange-related) shocks, such as slumps in external demand, world 
commodity prices instability (and correlated instability of terms of trade), international 
fluctuations of interest rates, etc. Other domestic shocks may also be generated by political 
instability or, more generally, by unforeseen political changes. These shocks, however, are not 
considered here, in as far as they seem less ‘exogenous’. 
Vulnerability can be perceived as the result of three components: 
i) the size and frequency of the exogenous shocks, either observed (ex post 
vulnerability) or anticipated (ex ante vulnerability);  
ii) exposure to shocks;  
iii) the capacity to react to shocks, or resilience.1 Resilience depends more on current 
policy, is more easily reversed, and is less structural. But there may also be a 
structural element in the resilience component of vulnerability.2 Thus, a distinction 
                                                 
1
  The concept of resilience is largely used in certain works more specifically oriented towards the 
environmental or natural sources of vulnerability (cf. Kaly et al. 1999). 
2
  A distinction close to this three component one is given in Rodrik (1999) who, in looking at the risk of social 
conflict in countries facing external shocks, considers the individual severity of the shocks, the depth of 
latent social conflict (likely to increase the impact of the shocks), and the quality of conflict management 
institutions. 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.07 
 
4 
can be made between structural vulnerability, which results from factors that are 
independent of a country’s current political will, and the vulnerability deriving from 
policy, which results from recent choices. For instance, the vulnerability of the Asian 
countries in the mid-1990s after the 1997 crisis is very different from the 
vulnerability of small economies or that of small islands that export raw materials. It 
is less structural, more the result of policy, thus more transient. This feature is clearly 
evident when vulnerability is measured according to the probability of a financial 
crisis that can be estimated mainly from financial and policy variables (see, for 
instance, Berg and Patillo 1999; Goldstein, Kaminski, and Reinhart 2000). If a 
vulnerability index is to be used in selecting certain countries for the allocation of 
long-term support by the international community, what needs to be measured is 
naturally the structural vulnerability, which essentially results from the size of the 
shocks that can arise and exposure to them. This distinction is not made less relevant 
by the present financial crisis. What is new is the size of the external shock (as well 
as the possible channels of transmission), but the vulnerability of developing 
countries to this shock still depends both on structural factors and on policy.  
It also follows that structural economic vulnerability should be clearly distinguished from 
state fragility. As was evidenced in several papers presented at the June 2007 UNU-WIDER 
conference, fragile states are defined—as are the LICUS—according to policy indicators, 
essentially the World Bank’s country policy and institutional assessment (CPIA). Fragile 
states are (developing, but low-income only occasionally) countries having with a (very) low 
policy score.3 Of course, many countries may meet both criteria of structural vulnerability as 
well as state fragility, due to the likely influence of the former on the latter, but the two 
concepts are founded on opposite grounds, structural versus policy factors, and cannot be used 
in the same way to design international policies, as we shall see below for aid policies. 
Finally, for the purpose of this paper, another distinction needs to be done between economic 
vulnerability and ecological fragility. The UN’s initial concern over vulnerability included 
both economic vulnerability and ecological fragility, but it quickly became clear that the two 
concepts should be analysed separately. For instance, losses in biodiversity reflect ecological 
fragility and are not necessarily major elements of economic vulnerability. The ad hoc expert 
group on vulnerability commissioned by the UN clearly recognized this difference (which 
was reaffirmed by the CDP), while also acknowledging that economic vulnerability could be 
induced by natural factors, i.e., by the environment (‘the relative susceptibility of economies 
to damage caused by natural disasters’, UN 1999). Thus, environmentally-induced economic 
vulnerability can be considered either as economic vulnerability or ecological vulnerability.4 
The EVI, as designed by the CDP, is clearly an index of structural economic vulnerability and 
is considered here as such. It relates to structural factors—not policy factors—that are beyond 
the present control of the country and which also influence global vulnerability, mainly 
                                                 
3
  For instance, belonging to the bottom two quintiles of the CPIA or with no CPIA for the Development 
Assistance Committee of the OECD. 
4
  The most comprehensive attempt to build an ‘environmental vulnerability index’ was undertaken by SOPAC 
(South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission) (cf. Kaly et al. 1999). In May 1999, the CDP considered 
several available indicators (the Commonwealth Secretariat composite vulnerability index, the Caribbean 
Bank economic vulnerability index, and the SOPAC environmental vulnerability index), before proposing a 
new and relatively simple index of economic vulnerability (UN 1999). In 2000, assessing the implementation 
of the outcome of the Barbados Conference, the GA (A/55/185) presented its own review of the several 
attempts to build a vulnerability index ‘for small island developing states’, a review which, to a large extent, 
focused on environmental issues. 
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through resilience. EVI has been designed to identify the nations among the low-income 
countries that are the most disadvantaged by structural handicaps to growth. 
It should be mentioned that EVI, for usage in identifying the LDCs, is measured for a larger 
set of countries than merely for this particular group, thus it encompasses not only other low-
income but also middle-income countries. It is, therefore, conceivable that EVI can also be 
applied to other purposes where the measurement of this structural handicap would appear 
useful. We argue that this is noticeably the case in searching for relevant aid allocation 
criteria. 
In the next sections of this paper we consider successively three issues: 
– what is the conceptual and empirical basis for an economic vulnerability index? 
– how can a structural economic vulnerability index be designed for the low-income 
countries in particular, and has it been done by the CDP? 
– how can such an economic vulnerability index be used in connection with international 
development policy, particularly for the identification of the LDCs and for aid 
allocation? 
2 Conceptual and empirical basis of an economic vulnerability index 
Let us very briefly review the reasons why economic vulnerability is detrimental to 
development (see Guillaumont 2006, 2008b). We refer to the dynamic definition of 
vulnerability—the risk that economic growth is markedly and extensively reduced by shocks. 
According to another somewhat broader dynamic definition, risk is the likelihood of negative 
and lasting effects on poverty reduction from shocks.  
We first examine the links between vulnerability and growth with reference to the three main 
components of vulnerability identified above (shocks, exposure and resilience), and then add 
few words on the direct effects on poverty.  
Shocks: the negative impact of instability on growth 
There is not much debate about the negative impact of ‘one-sided’ natural shocks such as 
earthquakes, typhoons, or floods. The damage is often huge, first in terms of the number of 
deaths, and second in the destruction of physical capital. Rather, the debate concerns the 
measurement of the size of these losses. But many shocks—particularly external ones—are 
‘two-sided’ (up-and-down cycles). The very nature of instability is a succession of booms and 
slumps (of export prices, external demand, rainfall, etc.). This is why in assessing 
vulnerability over a long period it is more appropriate to consider the impact of instability or 
volatility rather than the impact of separate shocks. The impact of these successive up-and-
down cycles is not neutral. Their impact may result from either an asymmetry of ex post 
reaction to positive and negative shocks or from the uncertainty generated by previous cycles. 
Consequently, there are both ex post and ex ante effects of instability (as Gunning 2004 
clearly underlines). However, most measures used in cross-section literature rely on ex post 
concepts. 
Structural sources of instability versus policy sources and growth volatility 
A few empirical studies propose a test for macro vulnerability that considers the instability of 
growth but without a specific and separate examination of its main sources. For example, 
Ramey and Ramey (1995) show a significant link between the instability of the rate of 
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economic growth and the average rate of growth itself (testing exogeneity of the instability). 
But this instability can also be due to structural as well as policy factors, which is why the 
volatility of growth cannot be an approximate indicator of structural vulnerability (cf. infra). 
The same applies to the recent, systematic attempt by Hnathovska and Loayza (2004) to 
assess the link between output volatility and growth. Neither study examines the impact of 
structural vulnerability as such. 
The effects of export instability, a main source of structural vulnerability in developing 
countries, have been examined over the years in the literature using growth regressions. There 
now seems to be a consensus emerging from several studies to conclude that export instability 
(or, in some studies, terms of trade instability) has a negative effect on growth.5 More 
significant effects are found when the studies simultaneously test the (positive) effect of 
export growth and the (negative) effect of export instability and when the export instability 
(size of the shocks) is either weighted by the average export-to-GDP ratio for the period 
(Guillaumont 1994; Combes and Guillaumont 2002)—a ratio which, ceteris paribus, is the 
higher the lower the population size, or is an instability of the export-to-GDP ratio itself 
(Dawe 1996). Thus, the exposure to shocks is taken into account. 
Primary versus intermediate instabilities 
The instability of export-earnings is not the only aspect of instability that has been tested. In 
an earlier study, we estimate the influence of several primary instabilities, mainly exogenous, 
on the rate of growth, and argue that these instabilities, significantly higher in Sub-Saharan 
Africa than in other developing countries, may have been a major factor in the region’s slow 
growth rate during the 1970s and 1980s: these instabilities are the instability of  the terms of 
trade, weighted by the average export-to-GDP ratio, or that of the real value of exports, 
similarly weighted, the instability of the agricultural value added (weighted by the average 
share of agricultural value added in GDP) and political instability. The first and the third 
factors appear to have a significant effect on growth, but not that of the agricultural value 
added (Guillaumont et al. 1999). However, in another study, instability of both real value of 
exports and agricultural value added (unweighted here) appears to be significant (Guillaumont 
and Chauvet 2001). Recently Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004) have found evidence of 
the impact of rainfall variations on growth in African countries during 1981-99 and on the 
subsequent likelihood of civil conflict.6 
The effects of primary instabilities have a greater impact on the rate of change in factor 
productivity than on the level of investment. Primary instability is channelled through 
intermediate economic instabilities (Guillaumont, Guillaumont Jeanneney, and Brun 1999), 
namely, instability of the rate of investment and of relative prices. These two intermediate 
instabilities have an adverse effect on growth and are related to policy which is weakened in 
this manner by structural vulnerability. First, instability of the rate of investment—curiously 
neglected in the literature—is a factor of lower average capital productivity. As a result of the 
declining marginal productivity of investment, the gain in total output from a high level of 
investment is smaller than the loss due to a low investment level. This is illustrated during 
                                                 
5
 See, for instance, Glezakos (1984); Gyimah-Brempong (1991); Fosu (1992, 2002); Guillaumont (1994); Lutz 
(1994); Dawe (1996); Mendoza (1997); Guillaumont, Guillaumont Jeanneney, and Brun (1999); Bleaney and 
Greenaway (2001); Combes and Guillaumont (2002); and the review of the literature by Araujo Bonjean, 
Combes, and Combes Motel (1999).  
6
  Actually the aim of their paper is to test the impact of negative growth shocks on the likelihood of civil 
conflict, and it only uses rainfall variations as an instrumental variable for economic growth. 
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boom periods by projects that are oversized, under-prepared and weakly productive, and 
mainly concerns public investment. The second intermediate instability, i.e., of the relative 
prices, proxied by the instability of the real effective exchange rate (REER), also appears to 
have a strong negative effect on the rate of growth. It is assumed to blur market signals and 
induce a misallocation of investment. This adverse impact of the REER instability or 
volatility has also been noted in several papers (Ghura and Grennes 1993; Serven 1997; 
Aizenman and Marion 1999; Guillaumont, Guillaumont Jeanneney, and Brun 1999). 
Instability of real producer prices—whether due to macro policy resulting through REER 
instability or the passing through of world agricultural prices fluctuations to farmers—is 
generally considered to be a factor in the lower average agricultural output, noticeably 
through its effects on the adoption of new technique, similarly to the weather risk (Newberry 
and Stiglitz 1981: see UN 2001 for a review of studies on the impact of risk on agricultural 
productivity). The effects of real producer prices instability on agricultural production growth 
have also been significantly tested at the macro level in a sample pooling several products in a 
number of countries (Guillaumont and Combes 1996; Boussard and Gérard 1996; and 
Subervie 2006 for the effects of real border prices instability). 
Thus it seems that external instability induces negative effects through the instability of the 
investment rate and in the real exchange rate, either via its impact on public finance when 
retained at the government level or at the producer level when price fluctuations are passed 
through to producers. 
Instability is also channelled to growth through political instability. The primary instabilities, 
and the induced intermediate ones, are a factor in political instability and civil war, and 
through these events, also a significant factor of slower growth. The instability of exports, all 
the more severe when exports are primary, exacerbates feelings of frustration. When exports 
instability, weighted by the openness rate is introduced in a conflict occurrence model à la the 
Collier-Hoeffler (2004), not only does the coefficient of determination increase significantly, 
but also the share of primary commodities in exports becomes insignificant (Guillaumont et 
al. 2005). Other exogenous shocks may have similar effects on the risk of conflict. In 
examining the impact of growth on civil war, Miguel, Satyanatah, and Sergenti (2004) 
instrument growth by rainfall variation, what is robust and suggests an impact of rainfall on 
the risk of civil war. 
2.1 The impact of shocks depends on exposure 
Country size exerts major influence  
The main structural factor in greater exposure to exogenous shocks is, of course, the 
smallness of a country. There are several methods for measuring the size of a country, but the 
most meaningful is the number of inhabitants. In some cases (possibly with regard to natural 
shocks) smallness of area could be a more relevant measure of the exposure to shocks, but for 
assessing the main economic consequences of the size of a country independently from its 
income per capita, the most common measure is its population numbers. 
The vulnerability issue is faced with both old and renewed discussion on the consequences of 
the size of nations.7 Of course, the size of a country has many consequences, not all of them 
related at first glance to vulnerability, as for example, scale economies in many activity 
                                                 
7
  See recent works by Alesina and Spolaore (2004) and Winters and Martins (2004). 
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sectors of industry as well as government (the unit costs of public administration are expected 
to be higher in smaller countries). However, when investigating the channels through which 
size does matter for development, links with vulnerability become clearly apparent. There are 
at least three main channels (or intermediate variables) through which small size influences 
the exposure components of vulnerability: (i) trade intensity, (ii) government size, and (iii) 
social cohesion. 
The variable exposure to external shocks is well-reflected by the export-to-GDP ratio. The 
smaller the (population) size, the higher (ceteris paribus) the trade-to-GDP ratio (and the 
more ‘dependent’ the economy). Country size is the main structural factor determining the 
trade-to-GDP ratio. Thus it is the main determinant of ‘natural openness’ and the main factor 
to be neutralized if an index of ‘openness policy’ is to be drawn from the observed ratios 
(Guillaumont 1989, 1994). It is clear that the larger the share of exports in GDP, the greater 
the impact of a given export shortfall. For this reason, the impact of export instability (and of 
export growth as well) is estimated more accurately when the export instability variable (as 
well as export growth) is multiplied by the export-to-GDP ratio, i.e., when it is a ‘weighted’ 
instability.8/9 
Moreover, the diseconomies of scale associated with smallness result in greater difficulties to 
diversify at low cost. As a consequence, small low-income countries face a higher risk of 
implementing inefficient or costly policies if they adopt protectionist measures. For the same 
reason, a global protectionist trend is likely to be more damaging for small countries. Alesina 
and Spolaore (2004) test this effect in a cross-section growth regression through a 
multiplicative variable of the (log of) population and openness. The coefficient of this 
multiplicative variable is found to be significantly negative, while the coefficient of each of 
the two variables added independently to the regression is significantly positive. 
Smallness is also considered to be a factor of slower growth through its assumed impact on 
the size of government. The assumption of a (negative) relationship between (population) size 
and the relative size of government activities is successfully tested by Alesina and Spolaore 
(2004). A reason may be found in an earlier work, Rodrik (1998) who argues that a high 
trade-to-GDP ratio (often related to a small population size) leads to an extension of the role 
of the state in order to provide more insurance to citizenry. The relationship can also be linked 
to the stronger effect of public revenue instability on public consumption. If the large size of 
government activities is a source of higher costs, this may again be the source of vulnerability 
due to smallness, and thus likely to lower growth. 
A third channel through which the country (population) size may impact on vulnerability and 
growth is social cohesion. It may be an advantage of smallness to allow for greater social 
cohesion (less ethnic, linguistic or religion fragmentation). If social fragmentation constitutes 
a negative factor of growth and if fragmentation increases with population size, then 
smallness is an advantage, not a handicap. It needs to be noted that fragmentation as a 
handicap is not unrelated to vulnerability: it is assumed to impact negatively on growth 
                                                 
8
  While natural openness, mainly determined by smallness, increases exposure to trade shocks and 
consequently their negative effect on growth, openness policy is not only a positive factor of growth, but also 
a factor of greater resilience (Guillaumont 1994; Combes and Guillaumont 2002). 
9
  Let us add that with regard to natural shocks or disasters, as far as they generally concern some specific 
groups of the population, the larger the population, the smaller the aggregate exposure: in a large country, 
climatic shocks are likely to affect only a small part of the population. 
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because this structural factor influences the exposure or resilience to shocks (Rodrik 1999). 
Reality may be more complex, and several studies indicate non-linear relationships where 
linear ones are assumed. In particular social polarization, rather than social fragmentation, 
may be a handicap (and a factor of vulnerability) (Arcand, Guillaumont, and Guillaumont 
Jeanneney 2002). Furthermore, polarization does not increase with population size, but rather 
decreases with size (at least beyond a low threshold).10 Also for same reason, smallness may 
appear to enhance, not lower, vulnerability.11 
Nevertheless, it is clearly apparent from several cross-country regressions that when 
appropriate control variables are used, the (log of) population size is a significant positive 
factor of growth (Guillaumont and Guillaumont 1988; Guillaumont and Chauvet 2001; 
Bosworth and Collins 2003; Millner and Weyman-Jones 2003; Alesina and Spolaore 2004) 
and a negative factor of export instability (Easterly and Kraay 2000). The fact that smallness 
reduces growth may be due either to higher vulnerability or to scale diseconomies or to their 
combination. 
Other factors of exposure 
In addition to smallness of population size, other factors of exposure to shocks are to be 
considered. These are related to the structure of the economy and to the location of the 
country, as primary economies and remote countries are more exposed to external and natural 
shocks. The extent of their risk is examined below with exposure indicators. Let us note here 
that remoteness—as with smallness—is a structural handicap not only because it is a factor of 
vulnerability.12 Indeed, distance remains an important obstacle to trade despite decreased 
transport costs (Brun, Guillaumont, and de Melo 1999; Brun et al. 2005; Carrère and Schiff 
2005). 
2.2 More on poverty effects of structural vulnerability 
Instability, through its effects of deterring long term growth, has deleterious consequences on 
the pace of poverty reduction. It also has direct social effects independent of its influence on 
the average rate growth. Two factors make these direct effects likely. The first is the feeling 
of frustration generated by a shortfall of income after a rapid expansion that created new 
needs and exaggerated expectations, as illustrated above by the risk of civil war or of crime. 
The second is related to poverty traps, linked to the asymmetry of reactions of health, 
education, employment to income fluctuations. Insofar as instability lowers growth, it not 
only retards poverty reduction that can normally be expected from growth, but also results in 
an anti-poor bias for a given average rate of growth. 
First, instability of income lowers child survival. Perhaps the best single indicator of the 
evolution of the social situation in low-income countries is the rate of child mortality under 
five, as made available by demographic and health surveys and extended by the WHO. Child 
mortality is a very sensitive indicator and is likely to reflect the strong asymmetric effect that 
                                                 
10
  Even the assumption of a negative correlation between population size and other linguistic fragmentation is 
debatable: when fragmentation is explained by the size of both the population and area, the coefficient of 
population size is significantly negative, while that of area is (significantly) positive. Since the absolute 
values of the coefficients are similar, it means that fragmentation decreases with population density (internal 
work in process at CERDI). 
11
 The greater social cohesion of small islands is also discussed by Helleiner (1996). 
12
 The relevance of remoteness for vulnerability has been underlined by Encontre (1999). 
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can be expected from income instability. If a rise in mortality results from an income shortfall, 
it will not be compensated later by an equal increase in income. Also, due to the existence of a 
lower limit to child mortality, the best functional form in which the dependent variable is 
expressed as a logit (Grigoriou 2005), implies for the relevant range of mortality values an 
asymmetry in the up and down effects of income variations. Tested in GMM, with 
observations every five years from 1980 to 2000, the effect of previous income instability on 
child survival appears to be significantly negative (Guillaumont 2006; Guillaumont, 
Korachais, and Subervie 2008). 
Second, instability of income lessens poverty reduction. When we introduce the macro 
vulnerability concern highlighted in the cross-country research on the determinants of the 
level and evolution of poverty, made feasible by the extension of a comparable dataset at the 
World Bank, it appears to be a neglected factor. Our main concern until now has been to 
assess the growth and inequality elasticities of poverty (there’s a good illustration in Adams 
2004), but without a similar concern with regard to the effects of income instability on 
poverty reduction.13 However, a reasonable assumption is that income instability pushes 
people into the poverty trap (the poor contracting health handicaps, children leaving school, 
workers dropping out of the labour market, …), so that the poverty reaction to a rise in 
average income is less than its reaction to a fall.14 This effect is expected to lower the 
absolute level of the average growth elasticity of poverty, and/or to increase poverty 
independently of income growth and inequality change: the instability of income must then be 
introduced both additively and multiplicatively with income growth. Measuring poverty 
change through the log of the headcount index of poverty on a sample of ten-year spells and 
controlling for the rate of growth of income per capita and initial level of poverty, we obtain 
significant coefficients for the impact of income instability on poverty. This effect 
corresponds to an increase in inequality which is captured only partially by the change in the 
Gini coefficient (another control variable).15 It must be remembered that in addition to this 
direct impact, growth volatility lowers the average rate of growth. Indeed, stability is good for 
growth, which is ‘good for the poor’, but it also makes growth better for the poor. Stability of 
growth makes it pro-poor (Guillaumont 2006, Guillaumont and Korachais 2008). 
3 Designing a structural economic vulnerability index, with particular reference to the 
UN-CDP index 
In this section we consider three issues: 
– structure of the present EVI; 
– sensitivity to methodological choices; and 
– some levels and trends, using a ‘retrospective EVI’ for the latter. 
                                                 
13
  The effects of financial instability on poverty, however, are examined by Guillaumont Jeanneney and Kpodar 
(2005). 
14
  See, for instance, de Janvry and Sadoulet (2000) in the context of Latin America. 
15
 Consistent with the idea that instability increases inequality, as found by Breen and Garcìa-Peñalosa (2005). 
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3.1 Structure of the present EVI 
The economic vulnerability index (EVI) is the composite index set up by the CDP and applied 
a first time in 2000 as a criterion for identifying the least developed countries. Incorporating 
minor amendments EVI was applied in 2003 and again, with major revisions, in 2006 (UN 
2000, 2003, 2006). Amendments and revisions were agreed upon one year before these two 
last (2003 and 2006) triennial reviews of the LDCs list (see UN 2005, and the 
recommendations given in Guillaumont 2004a, 2004b, 2006). The present EVI is a composite 
index calculated from seven component indices, made up of four shock indices and three 
exposure indices. Using an arithmetic averaging, equal weight is given to the sum of the 
shock indices and the sum of the exposure indices. In the shock indices, equal weight is given 
to natural and external shocks, while in the exposure indices equal weight is given to 
population size and to the total of other indices. Naturally, there are several other ways, some 
possibly more logical, how these component indices can be weighted and averaged 
(Guillaumont 2006, 2008b), but the method adopted in EVI by the CDP has been chosen for 
reasons of simplicity and transparency. The same reasons explain why the number of 
components is limited, so that they can be focused on the main aspects of structural 
vulnerability, and measurable as well. Indeed no index can capture all the aspects of the 
structural vulnerability. This is why, in the identification process of the Least Developed 
Countries, when a country is found eligible to graduation, a “vulnerability profile” is 
established covering these aspects possibly non covered by the EVI components.  
Here we consider a composite index16 rather than a single one, such as the growth volatility, 
commonly used in econometric works. The volatility or instability of the rate of growth of 
income (per capita) reflects ex post macro economic instability which depends on exogenous 
shocks and structural factors of exposure, but also on policy factors, either as a reaction to 
shocks or as autonomous policy shocks. There is clear empirical evidence of the influence of 
policy factors on growth volatility (Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz 2001; Combes et al. 2000).17 
Hence, growth rate volatility cannot be considered to constitute a good synthetic indicator of 
structural vulnerability. Moreover if costly insurance or compensatory mechanisms are at 
work, the negative impact of shocks on growth does not necessarily involve growth 
instability. 
In the design of the EVI, the components have been retained as they reflect the main channels 
through which structural vulnerability affects growth potential.  
Natural and trade shocks 
Climatic and other natural shocks are a main source of vulnerability in many developing 
countries and these cover a large variety of disasters: earthquakes, typhoons or hurricanes, 
floods, droughts, insect invasions, etc. An indicator of the risk of natural catastrophes might 
be the frequency of such events, measured over a long period of time. But as evidenced by the 
                                                 
16
  There are several earlier attempts in the literature to propose a composite indicator of economic vulnerability, 
Briguglio (1995); Atkins, Mazzi, and Ramlogan (1998); Crowards (1999); UN (1999); Guillaumont (2008b), 
for instance, but not all corresponding to our concept of structural vulnerability. 
17
  For instance, Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz stress the negative effect (up to a point) of financial depth and the 
positive effect of openness on volatility. More specifically, with regard to the effects of openness, Combes et 
al. (2000) find that structural vulnerability (depending on structural factors, including population size) makes 
growth more unstable, whereas outward-looking policy has the opposite effect. Bleaney and Fielding (2002) 
also examine the impact of the exchange rate regime on output volatility in addition to the impact of 
exogenous factors such as instability in the terms of trade. 
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recent Asian tsunami, the most severe and exceptional disaster does not correspond to any 
measurable probability. The potential negative impact of these very different catastrophes 
differs from one to the next, and/or even within the same type of disaster. Measuring the 
resulting economic losses in all the developing countries concerned seems an impossible task. 
A better approach would be to take the number of people affected, if known, but even then 
different people may be affected with varying severity. Indicators of the average proportion of 
the population affected can be used specifically with regard to the way the population is 
affected (killed, displaced, …).18 The percentage of population displaced due to natural 
disasters (homeless index) has been included as a component of EVI since 2003 when 
comparable data became available. 
Due to this data problem and to the fact that not all natural shocks (as for instance recurrent 
droughts in Sahelian countries) are registered as ‘disasters’, another proxy was needed. The 
answer was the instability of agricultural production, measured with regard to its trend value. 
Whereas the trend of agricultural production can be assumed to depend mainly on a country’s 
economic policy and certain other permanent factors, fluctuations around the trend can be 
hypothesized to be a reflection of the occurrence and severity of natural shocks, because these 
are likely to affect agricultural production.19 This is why this indicator was retained as a 
component of the EVI. 
The earlier two measures of natural shocks, which are not correlated20, are only 
complementary proxies of the size of the natural shocks that are likely to affect growth 
prospects (likely to be aggregated by a single average in a natural shocks index). They give an 
indication of the average size of past shocks which is only a proxy of the risk of similar 
shocks in the future. The risk of extreme or exceptional natural shocks, such as the December 
2004 Asian tsunami, cannot be captured ex ante by any index of the likelihood of shock. In 
the measures presented here, extreme conditions can only be reflected ex post, and more as a 
lasting damage, i.e., a structural handicap, than as a risk. This difficulty calls for more 
attention to be given to exposure indices. 
Another caveat is needed. Instability indices are related to a trend or to an average level. 
Trends, even if to some extent predictable, can also reflect a structural handicap (e.g., 
declining rainfall levels or rising sea levels). But they are not presently included as a 
component of EVI. 
The trade shocks indicator is represented by the instability in real export proceeds 
surrounding the trend. It needs to be applied to total exports of goods and services, as shocks 
affect both types of exports, and service exports in small (developing) countries often account 
for a large part of total receipts. Some private transfers, such as migrant remittances, could 
also be included. It is assumed that for small countries this instability is structural, resulting 
from exogenous events such as fluctuations in world prices, in external demand and in 
                                                 
18
 The main source of the data is the Emergency Events Database, compiled by the Center for Research on 
Epidemiology of Disaster (CRED) at the School of Public Health, Université Catholique de Louvain, data 
also given and supplemented in the IRC annual World Disasters Report. Based on these data sources, a 
picture of natural disasters in each of the LDCs can be found in UNDP (2001). A previous use of these data 
for the measurement of vulnerability is in Atkins, Mazzi, and Ramlogan (1998). 
19
 We use this indicator in several earlier studies (cf. for instance, Guillaumont and Guillaumont 1988; 
Guillaumont, Guillaumont-Jeanneney, and Brun 1999).  
20
 The coefficient of correlation between the two indices is only of 0.11 (see Table 5 the matrix of correlation 
between the component indices). 
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domestic events that are not related to policy (e.g., climatic shocks). Of course, some export 
volume fluctuation with regard to its trend may be due to instability of policy itself, but it can 
be hypothesized that policy has greater influence on the trend than the fluctuations of the 
export volume.21 However, the trend in the terms of trade, to a large extent, seems to be 
beyond the control of the country. When the terms of trade deteriorate (as when the sea level 
rises), it may be a handicap, but does not necessarily constitute (unexpected) shock. 
Furthermore, terms-of-trade trends may be reversible, whereas the trend in sea levels is hardly 
so. 
Equal weight is given to the trade shock index and to the natural shock index when they are 
averaged in the shock index.  
Exposure to shocks indicators 
Exposure indices are of particular importance for two reasons. First, the impact of shocks is 
the stronger the greater the exposure of the countries. And second, shocks indicators rely on 
the frequency of past events. These are taken as a probability of similar future events, but do 
not reflect the risk of being affected by exceptional future events, a risk which depends on 
exposure and which can therefore be captured through exposure indices. Four indicators are 
used for the measurement of exposure to shocks.22 
i) The first one is an index of the population size (in logs), considering that small size 
is a handicap due to vulnerability and other factors, as explained above. 
ii) The export concentration coefficient, as calculated by UNCTAD for a long time and 
frequently applied in academic literature, has been used since the first definition of 
EVI, but has been limited to the exports of goods (not services). 
iii) The share of agriculture, forestry, fisheries, instead of the (complement to 100 of) 
share of manufacturing and modern services, has been considered since 2003 as a 
better reflection of the exposure to trade and natural shocks. 
iv) An index of remoteness from world markets (adjusted for landlockedness), designed 
and calculated at CERDI, has been utilized by the CDP in the measurement of EVI. 
                                                 
21
 The use of instability indices as components of a vulnerability indicator raises measurement problems. 
Instability is always relative to a reference or trend value. It is measured, for instance, by the average 
absolute deviation from the reference or trend value, or more commonly, by the variance of this deviation. A 
critical issue is then the choice of this reference value, in particular the estimation of the trend. A 
deterministic trend has long been adopted, for instance, in the export-instability literature. This was often 
inappropriate due to the possibility of non-stationarity of the series. On the other hand, the series may not be 
purely stochastic, and the reference value can be conveniently estimated from a ‘mixed’ function, combining 
a deterministic element and a stochastic element: this is how instabilities of exports and of agricultural 
production have been estimated in the EVI and which we retain in the next simulations. Several other 
measures are used in the empirical literature on issues that concern us. For instance, measurements of growth 
volatility generally use the standard deviation of the rate of growth (which may not be appropriate when the 
rate of growth is not stationary). Other works on volatility use empirical filters such as the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter, in which a series is divided into ‘cycle’ and ‘trend’ components. When we compare the instabilities 
with regard to a trend measured from a mixed trend over 12 years similarly as is done for the CDP, and to an 
Hodrick-Prescott trend, the correlations obtained between the two series of instability are very high (either 
level or rank correlations) (CERDI calculations). 
22
 An extended discussion of the appropriate components of the exposure index is presented in Guillaumont 
(2008). 
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It measures the minimum (weighted) average distance for a country to reach a 
significant part (50 per cent) of the world market.  
With regard to each of these indicators, the LDCs appear, on average, to be more vulnerable 
than other developing countries. 
 
EVI in brief 
 
 
3.2 Methodological choices to aggregate the components:  
weighting and averaging issues 
The component indicators of EVI have been weighted and arithmetically averaged in a simple 
and transparent, although somewhat arbitrary manner. Next, we examine whether alternative 
methods could be considered. 
Arbitrary or revealed weights: vulnerability measured as the expected loss of growth? 
The simplest and most transparent way to aggregate is to calculate, after measuring each 
component on a same scale based on maximum and minimum values, an unweighted average 
of these components (as is commonly done for some popular indices such as the HDI). There 
is indeed an arbitrariness apparent in this method since the actual weight is given by the 
number of components, and then results from the choice of the components themselves. It 
seems reasonable to give equal weight to both the shock and exposure components so that the 
vulnerability index is an average of the exposure index (EXP) and the shock index (SH) with 
equal weight given to trade shocks (TS) and natural shocks (NS). As for the exposure index, 
since the main factor of exposure is the (small) size of the population (SP), it has been given a 
half weight, with the other half (RS) being shared between the location component 
(remoteness) and the economic structure or specialization component (share of agriculture and 
export concentration). 
To avoid the arbitrariness of equal weighting, some measures of vulnerability weigh the 
components by their estimated impact on the rate of growth or its instability. For instance, 
Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001) use a set of component indicators to build a composite 
indicator of vulnerability, in which the weights are not chosen a priori, but are drawn from an 
econometric regression so that they reflect the estimated impact on economic growth of the 
different components indicators (which is consistent with the definition of vulnerability as a 
handicap to growth). The resulting vulnerability indicator can be seen as the ceteris paribus 
impact of the exogenous shocks and exposure variables on economic growth. It is the 
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estimated loss of growth due to structural vulnerability.23 However, it has to be recognized 
that this method of measurement of structural vulnerability, dependent on the quality of the 
regressions, seems more appropriate for academic use than for international policy. Moreover 
specific problems arise for aggregate vulnerability indicators that need to be addressed in any 
case.  
Reflecting the interaction between shocks and exposure  
Let us consider the index of economic vulnerability as relying on four elements: shock index 
composed of a trade shock index and a natural shock index, and exposure index composed of 
indices for (low) size and ‘location and structure’. Several averaging methods may be used to 
combine shocks and exposure indices. In the (traditional) arithmetic averaging of the (four) 
elements, each index is taken independently from the others. If we want to take into account 
the fact that structural vulnerability is the result of the interaction of shocks and exposure, we 
may need to consider other methods of averaging. 
One method could be a semi-geometric averaging. This combines a geometric averaging of 
the two composite shock and exposure indices and an arithmetic averaging of the respective 
components of these two indices: the exogenous shocks indices, because these shocks are 
substitutes, are arithmetically averaged in the index of shocks, and an index of the exposure to 
shocks is similarly measured as an arithmetic average of the corresponding components, but 
the two respective indices of shocks and of exposure to the shocks are geometrically 
averaged, because shocks and exposure have multiplicative effects. The more a country is 
exposed to shocks, the greater effect they have on its vulnerability, and the greater the 
importance of the shocks, exposure makes a country all the more vulnerable. But this method 
should be specified with regard to another consideration or principle. 
Reflecting the increasing marginal impact of vulnerability components  
Rather than calculate the geometric average of the shock and exposure indices (EXP and SK) 
as: 
EVI = EXP ⋅ SK
 
it is preferable to consider giving more emphasis to the impact from the two shock and 
exposure indices which is greater, and to calculate: 
EVI = 1 − 1 − EXP( ) 1 − SK( ) . 
                                                 
23
  Another example of econometric weighting is given by the Commonwealth Secretariat index of vulnerability 
(Atkins, Mazzi, and Ramlogan 1998; Easter 1999). It is an estimated value of instability of the rate of 
growth, with three explanatory variables empirically chosen among more than fifty variables, reflecting 
policy factors as well as structural factors. One main problem with this indicator is that it measures 
vulnerability with regard to growth volatility which, as noted above, is not a good synthetic indicator of 
structural vulnerability since it depends on policy factors as well as structural ones. An alternative method 
would be to consider a ‘natural growth volatility’ estimated from a regression including only structural 
factors, not depending on policy, as the components of EVI are assumed to be. But such a measure would not 
be preferable to the estimation of the impact on growth of the structural vulnerability components: structural 
vulnerability has been designed with reference to growth, and would be better measured by a loss of growth 
than by an excess volatility. 
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The EVI is then drawn from a multiplicative index of low vulnerability. The relevance of this 
measurement can be illustrated by tsunami: in as far as the likelihood of shocks is not easy to 
assess, it is all the more important to consider very exposed countries as vulnerable, even if 
the past frequency of shocks has been low.24 
Another type of averaging, an intermediate one but convenient, is to take an arithmetic 
average of the indices of log values of each of the two shock and the two exposure indices 
after transforming them in indices of low vulnerability. This allows one to capture the various 
interactions between these elements in determining vulnerability (each component being first 
measured as a low vulnerability indicator, transformed in log, then taken as one less the index 
of this log value, so as to reflect a likely increasing marginal impact of the vulnerability 
factors). This arithmetic average of the complements to one of the log indices of the main 
vulnerability components can be written (with l’: index of the log of): 
EVI(al) = ¼ [(1-I’P)+(1- I’(1-RS)+(1-l’(1-NS)+(1-l’(1-TS))]  
The resulting EVI can be decomposed into each of the four indices (and their subgrouping in 
shocks and exposure indices). 
Sensitivity of results 
Naturally, major deviations in the level of EVI can be expected from changes in the choice of 
components and weights given to each, all the more that the components are weakly 
correlated (see in Table 5 the matrix of correlations). Significant differences can be observed 
between the EVI measured in 2006 and that what would have been obtained with the 
composition and weights of the 2003 EVI (average of the absolute difference of ranks among 
65 LDCs and other low-income countries (LICs) nearly equalling to 7). It is the anticipated 
result of the improvements introduced in the meanwhile.  
It is more interesting to look at the consequences of the averaging methods. Table 2 gives a 
simulation of EVI 2006, applying several averaging methods; comparisons are made through 
the differences in ranks among a set of 65 LDCs and other LICs, and the average of the 
absolute values of these differences25. Greater deviation from the arithmetic average used in 
2006 is obtained with the arithmetic average of log indices than with the semi-geometric 
average, because trade and natural shocks, which are separated in the former only (but 
gathered by a simple arithmetic average in the latter), are uncorrelated. When the average is 
not the smple arithmetic one, the higher the number of components, the larger the difference. 
                                                 
24
 It would indeed be conceivable to weigh the respective shock indicators by corresponding exposure 
indicators. In other words, each indicator of the size of the shocks could be weighted by an indicator of the 
exposure assumed to correspond to the shocks, and the aggregate index of vulnerability could be decomposed 
in vulnerability sub-indices related to each kind of shock. But there is no simple correspondence between 
shock and exposure indicators, for instance small-sized economies appear to be more exposed to natural 
shocks, not only to trade shocks (Maldives). Thus it seems easier and more relevant to weigh the average 
shock index by the average exposure index. 
25
 A similar way by which the comparison can be done would be to calculate a Spearman’s rankcorrelation 
coefficient for the various rankings. The advantage of the calculation of the average absolute difference of 
ranks is that it also show the rank differences for each country, as can be seen in Table 2. In other words it 
evidences not only the sensitivity of the overall results to the choice of the method, but also the country 
sensitivity to this choice.   
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3.3 Comparing synthetic indices, levels, and trends 
We briefly compare the synthetic indices from two datasets: (i) official dataset applied by the 
CDP at the 2006 review of the list of LDCs, and (ii) the tentative dataset of a ‘retrospective 
EVI’, as calculated by CERDI/FERDI in collaboration with UN-DESA over a 30-year period 
starting from 1970 and defined according to the 2006 EVI definition.26 It indicates no 
decrease, on average, in LDCs, although a decrease is evident elsewhere. Two detailed tables 
(Tables 3 and 4) related to the levels and trends of the country groups are given at the end of 
the paper.27 
The results between the two datasets do not differ significantly and this allows us to draw a 
few observations: 
— EVI is higher in the LDCs and in the SIDS than in other developing countries; 
— the gap between LDCs and non-LDCs is increasing, while the gap between SIDS 
and non-IDS is decreasing; 
— EVI is still higher in the SIDS than in the LDCs, but diminishing; 
— while the exposure index is significantly higher in the SIDS than in the LDCs, the 
shock index is higher in the LDCs;  
— the diminishing gap between the LDCs and the SIDS is due to the shock index, as 
the gap between the average exposure indices has not changed (see Appendix 
Table); 
— the slightly higher level of EVI in the low-income countries compared to middle-
income ones is due to a somewhat higher shock index, while the exposure index is 
lower. 
In brief, EVI on average is not only higher in the LDCs than in any other group of countries 
(except SIDS), but also does not appear to have declined, as in other groups (SIDS included). 
Averages from the 2006 review of the LDCs list, and from a retrospective database 
 Shock index Exposure index EVI 
 Averages from the 2006 review of LDC list 
LDCs 52 55 53 
Other LICs  37 37 37 
All LICs 47 44 46 
All MICs 37 47 43 
Landlocked countries 44 51 47 
SIDS 45 67 56 
 
Averages from the 2006 review of the LDCs list, and from a retrospective database 
                                                 
26
  This dataset will be available soon from the UN-DESA website. 
27
  To test the significance of the difference we use the non-parametric test of Wilcoxon. Whereas comparison of 
LDCs, as well of SIDS, to other developing countries is unambiguous, comparisons between LDCs and SIDS 
raise a specific problem due to the fact that the two categories are partly overlapping. For that reason, the 
significance of the differences are tested by only comparing the LDCs non SIDS and the SIDS non LDCs. 
We also consider how the overlapping group of LDCS-SIDS compare to the LDCs non SIDS and to the SIDS 
non LDCs. More.detailed comparison between LDCs and SIDS can be found in Guillaumont (2007a). 
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 Averages from a retrospective database 
 EVI  Shock index Exposure index 
 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99  1990-99 
LDCs 53 52 51  49 54 
Non-LDCs 43 39 38  35 3§ 
SIDS 59 56 54  44 64 
Non-SIDS 43 40 40  39 40 
4 Using EVI for international development policy 
Here we consider two main policy implications of the availability of the EVI. The more direct 
implication is related to the identification of the LDCs, the purpose for which the index has 
been created. The second issue, more indirect and general, is related to the use of EVI as an 
instrument in the design of aid policies. 
4.1 EVI as a criterion for identifying LDCs: the graduation issue28 
As noted in the introduction, EVI is one of the three criteria used by the Committee for 
Development Planning for the identification of the LDCs: GNI per capita and the human 
assets index (HAI), a composite index of health and education indicators, are the two other 
criteria. For inclusion in the list, a country must meet the three complementary criteria: be a 
low-income country, with a low level of human capital, and high vulnerability. The 
complementarity between the three criteria is consistent with the assumption of a combined 
effect of vulnerability and human capital on growth. The LDCs are low-income countries, 
suffering from structural handicaps, and assumed to exhibit both a low HAI and a high EVI 
(the three criteria complementary for inclusion). It implies that a high EVI, in association with 
a low HAI, is used to identify the risk of a poverty trap. Since 2000, the EVI approach has led 
to a few new inclusions: Senegal was the only country to have been included in 2000 as a 
result of EVI, and Papua New Guinea was to become eligible in 2006, its inclusion pending 
on its acceptance. 
The possibility of exit or graduation from the list, and related rules were introduced only in 
1991. These rules have been carefully designed to avoid premature departure from or 
movement in the list, such as countries, after exit, becoming again eligible for inclusion. 
Margins were imposed for the inclusion and graduation thresholds of the criteria. Exit 
eligibility is to be confirmed at two successive triennial reviews. And, more important, to be 
eligible for graduation, an LDC must show improvement in two of the benchmarks. Briefly 
stated, implementation of the criteria is asymmetric for inclusion and graduation. 
Since in 1991, only one country—Botswana—has graduated (1994). The graduation of Cape 
Verde and Maldives was ratified by the UN General Assembly in 2004 for implementation 
later. Samoa has been recommended by the CDP for graduation in 2006. Kiribati, Tuvalu, and 
Vanuatu were given the first-round eligibility clearance by CDP in 2006, but this needs to be 
reconfirmed at the 2009 review before any recommendation is made. 
It has to be noted that the LDCs mentioned above as possible graduates are SIDS. They have 
resisted the recommendation, and resistance by the Maldives was particularly strong, as is 
                                                 
28
  These issues are examined in greater depth in Guillaumont (2008b). 
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now from Samoa, based on the argument that these countries are highly vulnerable, as is 
evidenced by their EVI levels. Following this argument, some potential graduate countries 
have requested that an LDC could not be made to exit the list until it is no longer (highly) 
vulnerable, implying that (low) EVI would become a ‘compulsory’ criterion. 
If certain developing countries have been able to sustainably achieve a significant rate of 
growth as well as high levels of human capital, they are not likely to be locked in a poverty 
trap, as LDCs are generally assumed to be. And, the high level of their human capital, 
reflected in the fact that they can meet the corresponding (HAI) criterion for graduation, is 
perhaps the reason.  
The vulnerability of these countries, however, remains a matter of concern. This is why a 
smooth transition strategy for graduating countries has been proposed by the CDP and 
officially adopted by the UN General Assembly. Economic vulnerability should also be 
considered, through EVI, as a relevant parameter of aid policies.  
4.2 EVI as a criterion for aid allocation 
Reviewing some results about aid effectiveness 
Although a negative factor of growth, structural vulnerability is sometimes only captured by 
(exogeneous) export instability, and has been found to increase marginal aid effectiveness (the 
marginal contribution of aid to growth) more significantly than the quality of institutions and 
policy, so strongly put forward by Burnside and Dollar (2000) and the World Bank (1998). In 
other words, aid dampens the negative effects of vulnerability on growth (Guillaumont and 
Chauvet 2001; Chauvet and Guillaumont 2004, 2008). These growth-regression results are 
supported by the micro-macro analysis of the determinants of the rate of success of World 
Bank projects (Guillaumont and Laajaj 2006). It follows that aid is potentially more effective 
in vulnerable countries such as SIDS and LDC. To be noted, either pro-cyclical or contra-
cyclical aid may have a stabilizing impact with regard to exports, which we measure as the 
difference between export instability and aid plus export instability. This stabilizing impact is 
a significant factor of growth, confirming our previous results (Chauvet and Guillaumont 
2008). Moreover, aid, through its stabilizing impact, has a double effect on poverty reduction. 
First it enhances growth, which is a major factor in poverty reduction, and second, by making 
growth more stable which also makes it more pro-poor (Guillaumont 2006). These findings, 
briefly recalled, have implications for aid policies, and EVI may be helpful in drawing such 
implications. 
Structural vulnerability included among the criteria for aid allocation29 
A possible easier way to take economic vulnerability into account in the design of aid policies 
is to consider it as a relevant criterion of aid selectivity. The usual criteria of aid selectivity 
are the level of poverty (income per capita) and the quality of governance (based on the 
World bank’s CPIA or any other index, such as ICRG or the Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
index) (see for instance Collier and Dollar 2001, 2002; World Bank 2004, 2005). However, 
they do not include vulnerability, which could easily be done with EVI. 
                                                 
29
 More details can be found in Amprou, Guillaumont, and Guillaumont Jeanneney (2007) and in Guillaumont 
and Guillaumont Jeanneney (2006). 
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There are at least two reasons to support this. First, as seen above, aid effectiveness is 
increased by structural vulnerability: aid will be more effective if allocated according to 
vulnerability (among other criteria). It is an empirically grounded argument that is as solid as 
the similar argument used to retain governance as a criterion. The second reason is one of 
justice or equity: if we acknowledge that the goal of aid is to compensate for structural 
handicaps to growth in order to promote an equality of opportunities/chances, this is again a 
legitimate rational for retaining structural vulnerability as an aid-allocation criterion. 
Finally, a practical matter has to be kept in mind. Retaining vulnerability, possibly EVI, as an 
ex ante aid allocation criterion would lead to an immediate dampening of unforeseen shocks, 
which is not as easy to achieve with other (albeit useful) schemes that try to trigger aid as an 
insurance.30 The challenge is to compensate negative shocks quickly, while promoting good 
governance and avoiding moral hazard.31 Here again, for the implementation of such 
schemes, priority could be given to the developing countries recognized as highly vulnerable  
 
Summary impact of changing the measurement of aid selectivity 
average absolute value of rank differences for 42 multilateral and bilateral donors  
and for 22 bilateral donors, 2003 
 All 43 donors Bilateral donors only 
Between Dollar-Levin (2004) indices and other elasticity based 
estimates, including : 
  
Income pc and other governance index (KKI) 8.7 3.8 
Income pc and vulnerability (EVI) 13.5 7.63 
Income pc and MDGs (HAI) 11.8 6.09 
All the five criteria (‘global model)  12.8 7.27 
   
Between an index based on global allocation model estimates and 
recipient average profile index 
7.25 3.63 
Source:  Amprou, Guillaumont, and Guillaumont Jeanneney (2007). 
with respect to EVI. In any case, effective implementation of compensation schemes is more 
difficult than the inclusion of EVI as an aid allocation criterion. 
Such an inclusion would lead to significant changes in aid allocation for the benefit of the 
more vulnerable countries, LDCs as well as the SIDS. And it would change radically the 
assessment of donor aid selectivity, as is recently evidenced elsewhere (Amprou, 
Guillaumont, and Guillaumont Jeanneney 2007: table 4). We have compared the rank of 
donors, bilateral as well as multilateral, on their aid selectivity, measured either from aid 
elasticities to the indicators corresponding to agreed criteria, as is done by Dollar and Levin, 
or by what we call the ‘average profile of receivers’, according to which the profile is the 
average of the level of these indicators, weighted by the share of aid allocated to each of them. 
Summary results are given above. 
                                                 
30
  These views are extensively discussed in other papers (Collier et al. 1999; Guillaumont and Guillaumont 
Jeanneney 2003; Sarris 2003; Gilbert and Tabova 2005; Guillaumont 2006; Guillaumont et al. 2007). 
31
 The answer is to offer automatic compensation when management rules (particularly in the case of positive 
shocks) are ex ante agreed and implemented. It could be obtained through a regulation of debt service (+/–) 
according to the evolution of the terms of trade, or through a special fund for little indebted countries. Links 
between the micro and macro variables have to be checked, to make the insurance scheme effective not only 
at the macrolevel, but also for the groups more severely affected by the shocks, such as small farmers. 
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Structural vulnerability versus state fragility in aid allocation: EVI versus CPIA 
The concern about fragile states, the focus of the UNU-WIDER development conference on 
Fragile States—Fragile Groups, may enhance our argument for introducing structural 
vulnerability (measured possibly by EVI) as a relevant criterion for aid allocation and for 
helping to solve the current paradox.32 According to the traditional paradigm, aid, on one 
hand, is not effective in countries with poor policies and institutions (generally measured by 
CPIA), while, on the other hand, the growing consensus is that some aid has to be provided to 
fragile states (often still identified by CPIA) to avoid these from becoming even more fragile. 
The so-called ‘orphean states’ are the children of the traditional paradigm.33 It is not 
surprising that the results of regressions on aid effectiveness in fragile states are mixed or 
complex (see Chauvet and Collier 2005; McGillivray and Feeny 2007). Structural 
vulnerability, as we argue, makes aid more effective, but is also a factor of state fragility 
which, when measured by a policy indicator such as CPIA, is expected to make aid less 
effective. In a previous paper (Chauvet and Guillaumont 2004) we find that, while aid 
effectiveness is increased by structural vulnerability, it is decreased by political instability (a 
form of state fragility). It is also decreased with the quality of previous policy (suggesting a 
possible improvement from a low level or fragile state when aid is appropriately delivered). 
When state fragility results from structural vulnerability, aid dampens its negative effect, but 
when this is not the case, it is likely to have the opposite effect.  
Nevertheless, there is a need to investigate the relationships between structural vulnerability 
and state fragility, as well as their implications for aid allocation. It could be argued that 
structural vulnerability (through EVI) should be a criterion for aid allocation, while state 
fragility, or any policy or institutional indicator, should be considered in determining the 
appropriate modalities of aid, and not only as (even less than) an aid allocation criterion 
(Guillaumont and Guillaumont Jeanneney 2006). 
5 Conclusion: two complementary uses of EVI, although its limitations  
Structural economic vulnerability is a matter of concern, particularly for small states (SIDS) 
and the least developed countries (LDCs), although differently for each group. It can be 
conveniently captured by the economic vulnerability index (EVI) designed at the UN by the 
Committee for Development Policy. This index is an instrument needed for international 
development policies in two complementary fields. 
The first is the identification of the LDCs, which are low-income countries suffering the most 
from structural handicaps to growth. Economic vulnerability, as reflected by EVI, is one of 
the two main structural handicaps to be considered, in conjunction with the second, i.e., a low 
level of human capital (as measured by HAI). For inclusion in the list of LDCs, countries, 
when meeting the vulnerability criterion, should also exhibit low income per capita and a low 
level of human capital. Consequently, once a country reaches a per capita income level well 
above the low-income threshold and has a relatively high level of human capital, although still 
vulnerable, it is likely to be graduated from the list.  
                                                 
32
  This point is developed in Guillaumont (2008a). 
33
  Indeed, for the year 2005 and 57 IDA eligible countries for which CPIA data are available, the level of CPIA 
appears significantly and negatively correlated to that of EVI (as measured for the 2006 review), once the 
level of income per capita is controlled for.  
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And second, EVI is needed in the geographical allocation of aid. For effectiveness and equity 
reasons, structural vulnerability (EVI) should be considered as one of the main relevant 
criteria of aid allocation; its use would favour vulnerable countries, LDCs as well as SIDS, 
and would possibly legitimate aid to some fragile states. 
Two reasons may be given to underline the complementarity of these two uses of EVI. First, 
using EVI as an aid allocation criterion would facilitate both reaching the specific target of 
official development aid to LDCs (0.15 per cent) and lead to modulate aid among them. 
Second, it would allow graduated, albeit still vulnerable, former LDCs (generally SIDS) to 
benefit from certain preference in aid allocation.  
Through these two uses as well as through possible other applications (such as trade policy), 
EVI, with possible improvements, could ensure that structural vulnerability is taken into 
account effectively. 
EVI has been progressively set up from 2000 in view of improving the identification of the 
LDCs. It has now been used during four triennial reviews of the list of LDCs, in 2000 and 
2003 with its initial structure, in 2006 and 2009 with its new structure. According to this new 
structure it has also been calculated retrospectively over three decades. Moreover, considering 
how vulnerability challenges development beyond the circle of the LDCs, it has been 
proposed to use EVI as one of the criteria of aid allocation. 
To meet these two objectives the index has to be largely recognized and accepted. That 
involves some trade_off between stability in the design of the index and search of improved 
relevance.   Improvements and complements are to be examined in two main directions. One 
is naturally suggested by the present financial crisis: needed is to develop appropriate 
indicators of the risk of financial crisis. It is not sure that low income countries are mainly 
threatened by financial contagion, but indicators of the risk of contagion, again dicriminating 
beween structural and present policy factors would be useful.  The second way to follow 
would be to investigate whether and how the environmental factors of vulnerability can be 
given more attention. This question, already discussed among the CDP members, has led until 
now to retain these factors in EVI only when corresponding indicators are available to reflect 
structural handicaps to growth, As such EVI, is not an index of environmental vulnerability, 
which also could be used for international policy, in the environment field.  The limitations of 
EVI seem to suggest the need for additional indices with their proper focus rather than a 
broadening of EVI eluding what it means.    
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Acronyms 
CDP Committee for Development Planning (of the United Nations) 
CERDI centre d'études et recherches sur le développement international 
CPIA country policy and institutional assessment 
EVI economic vulnerability index 
HAI human assets index  
LDCs least developed countries  
HDI human development index 
LICs low-income countries 
LICUS low-income countries under stress 
REER real effective exchange rate 
SIDS small island developing states 
UN-DESA Department of Economic and Social Affairs (of the United Nations) 
UN United Nations 
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Table 1 - EVI level for 65 Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and other low income countries, as calculated for the 2006 review of the list of LDCs, with the measure of each component
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) = 1/2 (3+4) (6) (7) (8) = 0.5 (6+7) (9) (10)= (11)= 0.5 (10+11)
0.5( (1)+ 0.5(2+5) ) 0.5 (8+9)
EVI, 2006 review Population, 2005 Remoteness  Export concentration shares of agriculture, etc. Specialisation % homeless Agricultural instability Natural Export instability exposure shock 
2003 or latest year 2003 or 2004 index 1990-2004 1979-2004 shock 1979-2004 index index EVI
(Main source: UNCTAD) index Trade shock
values Max-min Indice Max-min values Max-min values Max-min values logs Max-min values Max-min values Max-min
LI L Afghanistan 29 863 010       18,59 0,766 83,30 0,318 a 25,65 38,0 63,33 44,49 0,51 -0,67 60,83 15,36 74,91 67,87 32,10 90,95 41,24 79,41 60,33
LI L Angola 15 941 390       28,24 0,679 72,36 0,911 95,42 15,5 25,78 60,60 0,21 -1,58 51,11 4,68 17,16 34,14 17,37 44,91 47,36 39,52 43,44
LI L Bangladesh 141 822 300     0,00 0,587 60,82 0,298 23,32 19,8 33,05 28,19 2,88 1,06 79,22 3,47 10,67 44,95 7,38 13,68 22,25 29,31 25,78
LI L Benin 8 438 853         38,02 0,579 59,84 0,456 41,92 35,0 58,35 50,13 0,91 -0,09 66,99 6,48 26,92 46,95 24,71 67,83 46,50 57,39 51,95
LI L Bhutan 2 162 546         58,96 0,768 83,50 0,415 37,01 33,2 55,38 46,20 0,06 -2,89 37,16 6,32 26,05 31,60 12,95 31,09 61,91 31,35 46,63
LI L Burkina Faso 13 227 840       31,11 0,736 79,54 0,602 59,06 33,8 56,37 57,71 0,12 -2,09 45,73 7,76 33,86 39,80 18,10 47,20 49,87 43,50 46,68
LI L Burundi 7 547 515         39,74 0,864 95,54 0,650 64,67 49,0 81,67 73,17 0,42 -0,87 58,64 5,64 22,37 40,51 26,97 74,91 62,05 57,71 59,88
LI L Cambodia 14 071 010       30,16 0,636 67,03 0,405 a 35,87 34,0 56,71 46,29 2,39 0,87 77,23 8,01 35,19 56,21 24,20 66,24 43,41 61,22 52,32
LI Cameroon 16 321 860       27,88 0,598 62,31 0,448 40,99 23,1 38,47 39,73 0,02 -3,74 28,14 3,53 10,97 19,55 13,84 33,86 39,45 26,71 33,08
L Cape Verde 506 807            81,28 0,580 59,96 0,482 44,98 6,2 10,33 27,65 1,19 0,17 69,79 15,96 78,16 73,97 13,44 32,62 62,54 53,30 57,92
LI L Central African Republic 4 037 747         49,36 0,802 87,71 0,491 45,94 59,3 98,91 72,43 1,55 0,44 72,59 3,89 12,91 42,75 12,92 31,01 64,71 36,88 50,80
LI L Chad 9 748 931         35,80 0,671 71,33 0,630 a 62,37 29,9 49,84 56,11 1,16 0,14 69,48 7,81 34,11 51,80 40,32 100,00 49,76 75,90 62,83
LI L Comoros 797 902            74,30 0,727 78,36 0,881 91,88 40,9 68,11 80,00 0,08 -2,55 40,76 2,87 7,39 24,08 27,59 76,84 76,74 50,46 63,60
LI Congo,Rep of 3 998 904         49,51 0,658 69,81 0,853 88,61 6,3 10,46 49,53 1,60 0,47 72,97 2,32 4,45 38,71 19,17 50,52 54,59 44,61 49,60
LI Côte d'Ivoire 18 153 870       26,24 0,603 62,91 0,389 33,99 25,9 43,17 38,58 0,114 c -2,17 44,87 4,28 15,04 29,95 11,68 27,13 38,49 28,54 33,52
LI Dem. Peo's Rep.Korea 22 487 660       22,95 0,602 62,74 0,251 a 17,77 29,9 49,87 33,82 4,35 1,47 83,58 8,15 35,94 59,76 12,53 29,77 35,61 44,77 40,19
LI L Dem. Rep. of the Congo 57 548 740       8,50 0,658 69,77 0,555 a 53,58 51,9 86,57 70,08 0,35 -1,04 56,89 3,72 12,00 34,44 21,44 57,62 39,21 46,03 42,62
L Djibouti 793 078            74,39 0,618 64,75 0,584 56,91 3,1 5,15 31,03 3,33 1,20 80,73 8,81 39,52 60,12 21,64 58,25 61,14 59,19 60,16
LI L Equatorial Guinea 503 519            81,38 0,602 62,74 0,888 a 92,67 34,7 57,90 75,29 2,156 d 0,77 76,11 6,78 28,52 52,31 28,64 80,13 75,20 66,22 70,71
LI L Eritrea 4 401 357         48,03 0,618 64,70 0,589 57,51 13,6 22,74 40,12 0,49 -0,72 60,27 18,76 93,29 76,78 28,19 78,72 50,22 77,75 63,99
LI L Ethiopia 77 430 700       3,93 0,618 64,70 0,411 36,62 43,0 71,63 54,13 0,20 -1,59 51,07 14,28 69,06 60,06 13,84 33,89 31,67 46,97 39,32
LI L Gambia 1 517 079         64,41 0,561 57,60 0,459 42,28 26,4 43,98 43,13 0,42 -0,87 58,68 18,42 91,47 75,08 13,51 32,85 57,39 53,96 55,68
LI Ghana 22 112 810       23,21 0,597 62,17 0,390 34,08 36,1 60,19 47,14 1,30 0,27 70,77 7,66 33,30 52,04 14,56 36,12 38,93 44,08 41,50
LI L Guinea 9 402 098         36,36 0,587 60,85 0,547 52,55 21,6 36,06 44,31 0,302 d -1,20 55,21 3,48 10,72 32,97 8,25 16,41 44,47 24,69 34,58
LI L Guinea-Bissau 1 586 344         63,73 0,572 58,99 0,877 91,40 67,8 100,00 95,70 0,10 -2,27 43,79 4,26 14,92 29,35 33,18 94,30 70,54 61,83 66,18
LI L Haiti 8 527 777         37,86 0,632 66,55 0,273 20,34 28,3 47,11 33,73 1,54 0,43 72,56 2,73 6,63 39,59 34,89 99,66 44,00 69,63 56,81
LI India 1 103 371 000  0,00 0,559 57,42 0,130 3,55 22,2 37,01 20,28 0,51 -0,68 60,74 3,11 8,71 34,72 3,85 2,67 19,43 18,70 19,06
LI Indonesia 222 781 500     0,00 0,749 81,16 0,125 2,91 16,0 26,71 14,81 0,42 -0,86 58,80 3,08 8,56 33,68 8,66 17,68 23,99 25,68 24,84
LI Kenya 34 255 720       16,48 0,673 71,57 0,251 17,81 14,0 23,29 20,55 0,01 -4,49 20,11 5,42 21,21 20,66 7,40 13,75 31,27 17,20 24,24
L Kiribati 99 350              100,00 0,724 78,00 0,643 63,91 17,3 28,82 46,36 5,013 d 1,61 85,10 12,55 59,72 72,41 49,82 100,00 81,09 86,20 83,65
LI L Laos 5 924 145         43,46 0,808 88,47 0,312 a 24,96 48,1 80,09 52,52 20,34 3,01 100,00 8,16 35,99 67,99 18,84 49,52 56,98 58,76 57,87
LI L Lesotho 1 794 769         61,83 1,000 100,00 0,352 29,59 16,1 26,77 28,18 0,06 -2,83 37,78 7,56 32,76 35,27 16,09 40,92 62,96 38,09 50,53
LI L Liberia 3 283 267         52,54 0,604 63,03 0,634 62,86 75,8 100,00 81,43 0,08 -2,52 41,14 11,28 52,88 47,01 35,17 100,00 62,39 73,51 67,95
LI L Madagascar 18 605 920       25,86 0,735 79,32 0,483 45,07 26,2 43,63 44,35 3,78 1,33 82,10 2,25 4,03 43,06 14,36 35,50 43,85 39,28 41,57
LI L Malawi 12 883 940       31,51 0,931 100,00 0,605 59,46 33,6 56,07 57,76 0,49 -0,71 60,43 10,12 46,58 53,51 13,06 31,43 55,20 42,47 48,83
L Maldives 329 198            87,91 0,788 86,03 0,472 43,74 7,7 12,80 28,27 13,80 2,62 95,87 4,00 13,54 54,70 5,61 8,16 72,53 31,43 51,98
LI L Mali 13 518 420       30,78 0,747 80,86 0,822 84,99 36,3 60,57 72,78 0,14 -1,98 46,91 6,13 25,04 35,98 11,62 26,94 53,80 31,46 42,63
LI L Mauritania 3 068 742         53,58 0,511 51,43 0,509 48,09 19,9 33,17 40,63 1,83 0,60 74,35 3,40 10,27 42,31 9,51 20,33 49,80 31,32 40,56
LI Mongolia 2 646 487         55,86 0,775 84,36 0,357 30,28 20,0 33,38 31,83 0,01 -5,09 13,78 8,06 35,46 24,62 18,45 48,29 56,98 36,46 46,72
LI L Mozambique 19 792 300       24,91 0,759 82,43 0,631 a 62,48 21,5 35,80 49,14 3,03 1,11 79,75 7,30 31,37 55,56 11,96 27,99 45,35 41,78 43,56
LI L Myanmar 50 519 490       10,50 0,598 62,21 0,358 30,40 58,3 97,24 63,82 0,31 -1,17 55,50 4,97 18,76 37,13 21,64 58,24 36,76 47,69 42,22
LI L Nepal 27 132 630       20,06 0,758 82,20 0,304 24,01 38,0 63,39 43,70 0,60 -0,51 62,49 3,95 13,26 37,87 12,23 28,84 41,50 33,35 37,43
LI Nicaragua 5 486 685         44,64 0,692 73,95 0,220 14,14 17,8 29,70 21,92 0,43 -0,83 59,05 8,81 39,52 49,29 13,79 33,71 46,29 41,50 43,89
LI L Niger 13 956 980       30,28 0,722 77,69 0,548 52,72 38,4 64,06 58,39 0,89 -0,11 66,73 12,98 62,03 64,38 14,93 37,27 49,16 50,83 49,99
LI Nigeria 131 529 700     0,00 0,579 59,84 0,996 100,00 25,7 42,87 71,43 0,31 -1,18 55,36 3,73 12,08 33,72 28,50 79,68 32,82 56,70 44,76
LI Pakistan 157 935 100     0,00 0,542 55,28 0,231 15,36 21,5 35,87 25,62 5,83 1,76 86,71 3,23 9,34 48,02 7,62 14,43 20,22 31,23 25,73
LI Papua New Guinea 5 887 138         43,56 0,708 75,99 0,374 32,20 27,5 45,83 39,02 3,40 1,22 80,97 1,60 0,53 40,75 14,13 34,79 50,53 37,77 44,15
LI L Rwanda 9 037 690         36,97 0,849 93,69 0,395 34,75 41,3 68,84 51,79 0,11 -2,18 44,76 13,58 65,30 55,03 26,23 72,58 54,85 63,81 59,33
L Samoa 184 984            96,78 0,815 89,33 0,602 59,09 13,1 21,82 40,46 16,29 2,79 97,64 7,52 32,54 65,09 13,19 31,85 80,83 48,47 64,65
LI L Sao Tome and Principe 156 523            99,35 0,620 65,06 0,927 97,27 17,0 28,27 62,77 0,002 b -6,38 0,00 7,03 29,87 14,94 20,41 54,40 81,63 34,67 58,15
LI L Senegal 11 658 170       33,05 0,561 57,58 0,290 22,32 15,1 25,17 23,75 0,57 -0,56 62,01 16,53 81,26 71,63 9,99 21,83 36,86 46,73 41,80
LI L Sierra Leone 5 525 478         44,54 0,594 61,72 0,857 89,07 47,9 79,78 84,42 0,253 d -1,37 53,31 5,46 21,39 37,35 35,97 100,00 58,80 68,68 63,74
LI L Solomon Islands 477 742            82,18 0,764 82,94 0,437 39,65 44,9 74,86 57,26 0,32 -1,12 55,97 9,68 44,23 50,10 11,06 25,18 76,14 37,64 56,89
LI L Somalia 8 227 826         38,41 0,664 70,47 0,907 94,91 65,0 100,00 97,45 6,98 1,94 88,62 9,12 41,18 64,90 30,63 86,34 61,19 75,62 68,40
LI L Sudan 36 232 950       15,61 0,547 55,82 0,589 57,56 45,6 76,06 66,81 0,73 -0,31 64,59 8,42 37,39 50,99 25,88 71,49 38,46 61,24 49,85
LI L Tanzania, United Rep. of 38 328 810       14,75 0,699 74,93 0,347 29,07 41,3 68,86 48,97 0,19 -1,64 50,50 3,97 13,35 31,92 11,92 27,88 38,35 29,90 34,12
LI L Timor-Leste 947 064            71,66 0,469 46,08 0,259 a 18,70 30,5 50,80 34,75 0,109 d -2,22 44,31 4,88 18,29 31,30 120,80 100,00 56,04 65,65 60,84
LI L Togo 6 145 004         42,90 0,592 61,52 0,318 25,64 40,8 67,98 46,81 1,58 0,46 72,83 5,47 21,45 47,14 15,49 39,03 48,53 43,08 45,81
L Tuvalu 10 441              100,00 0,764 82,94 0,978 100,00 18,9 31,44 65,72 5,52 1,71 86,12 21,10 100,00 93,06 42,69 100,00 87,17 96,53 91,85
LI L Uganda 28 816 230       19,14 0,853 94,13 0,288 22,13 30,9 51,44 36,79 0,17 -1,77 49,08 3,27 9,57 29,33 27,25 75,77 42,30 52,55 47,42
L Vanuatu, Republic of 211 367            94,73 0,764 82,94 0,404 35,75 21,4 35,62 35,69 5,16 1,64 85,40 8,81 39,49 62,44 15,96 40,51 77,02 51,48 64,25
LI Viet Nam 84 238 230       2,64 0,605 63,17 0,239 16,32 20,1 33,48 24,90 1,52 0,42 72,42 2,12 3,37 37,90 21,69 58,40 23,34 48,15 35,74
LI L Yemen 20 974 660       24,02 0,563 57,91 0,896 93,62 14,2 23,73 58,68 1,25 0,23 70,34 5,21 20,07 45,20 16,09 40,90 41,16 43,05 42,11
LI L Zambia 11 668 460       33,04 0,939 100,00 0,504 47,58 20,8 34,72 41,15 0,11 -2,21 44,42 9,86 45,19 44,80 14,62 36,33 51,81 40,56 46,19
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Table 2: Impact of averaging on the level of EVI, recalculated from the data of the 2006 review 
of the list of LDCs, regrouped in four categories of equal weight, 65 LDCs and other low 
income developing countries 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
arithmetic semi-geometric arithmetic of logs average of ranks rank differences
values ranks values ranks values ranks values ranks 1-2 1-3 1-4 2-3
LI L Afghanistan 60,33 52 65,22 54 41,21 46 50,67 51 -2 6 1 8
LI L Angola 43,44 22 43,58 21 28,45 23 22,00 21 1 -1 1 -2
LI L Bangladesh 25,78 5 25,87 4 13,85 4 4,33 5 1 1 0 0
LI L Benin 51,95 40 52,26 39 31,82 32 37,00 37 1 8 3 7
LI L Bhutan 46,63 29 48,86 33 33,93 37 33,00 33 -4 -8 -4 -4
LI L Burkina Faso 46,68 30 46,78 29 31,15 30 29,67 29 1 0 1 -1
LI L Burundi 59,88 50 59,93 48 46,79 53 50,33 50 2 -3 0 -5
LI L Cambodia 52,32 42 53,16 41 31,93 33 38,67 40 1 9 2 8
LI Cameroon 33,08 6 33,38 6 20,34 7 6,33 6 0 -1 0 -1
L Cape Verde 57,92 47 58,17 45 42,43 48 46,67 46 2 -1 1 -3
LI L Central African Republic 50,80 39 52,81 40 40,90 45 41,33 41 -1 -6 -2 -5
LI L Chad 62,83 54 65,20 53 54,17 60 55,67 56 1 -6 -2 -7
LI L Comoros 63,60 55 66,05 56 49,66 55 55,33 55 -1 0 0 1
LI Congo,Rep of 49,60 35 49,85 35 32,52 35 35,00 35 0 0 0 0
LI Côte d'Ivoire 33,52 7 33,70 7 20,65 8 7,33 7 0 -1 0 -1
LI Dem. Peo's Rep.Korea 40,19 13 40,37 13 24,62 14 13,33 13 0 -1 0 -1
LI L Dem. Rep. of the Congo 42,62 20 42,72 20 26,43 18 19,33 20 0 2 0 2
L Djibouti 60,16 51 60,17 49 40,25 41 47,00 47 2 10 4 8
LI L Equatorial Guinea 70,71 63 71,05 63 51,25 57 61,00 61 0 6 2 6
LI L Eritrea 63,99 57 66,72 59 43,57 49 55,00 54 -2 8 3 10
LI L Ethiopia 39,32 12 39,81 12 23,55 11 11,67 12 0 1 0 1
LI L Gambia 55,68 43 55,71 42 40,33 42 42,33 42 1 1 1 0
LI Ghana 41,50 15 41,56 15 25,31 15 15,00 14 0 0 1 0
LI L Guinea 34,58 9 35,33 9 23,37 10 9,33 10 0 -1 -1 -1
LI L Guinea-Bissau 66,18 60 66,46 57 53,55 59 58,67 59 3 1 1 -2
LI L Haiti 56,81 44 58,76 46 46,63 52 47,33 48 -2 -8 -4 -6
LI India 19,06 1 19,06 1 10,27 1 1,00 1 0 0 0 0
LI Indonesia 24,84 3 24,84 3 13,22 2 2,67 2 0 1 1 1
LI Kenya 24,24 2 24,56 2 14,89 5 3,00 3 0 -3 -1 -3
L Kiribati 83,65 64 83,85 64 74,95 64 64,00 64 0 0 0 0
LI L Laos 57,87 46 57,88 44 41,30 47 45,67 44 2 -1 2 -3
LI L Lesotho 50,53 38 52,11 38 35,71 39 38,33 39 0 -1 -1 -1
LI L Liberia 67,95 61 68,43 60 61,08 63 61,33 62 1 -2 -1 -3
LI L Madagascar 41,57 16 41,61 16 26,64 19 17,00 16 0 -3 0 -3
LI L Malawi 48,83 34 49,23 34 37,66 40 36,00 36 0 -6 -2 -6
L Maldives 51,98 41 56,60 43 40,85 44 42,67 43 -2 -3 -2 -1
LI L Mali 42,63 21 43,72 23 32,84 36 26,67 27 -2 -15 -6 -13
LI L Mauritania 40,56 14 41,29 14 27,61 20 16,00 15 0 -6 -1 -6
LI Mongolia 46,72 31 47,71 31 31,39 31 31,00 31 0 0 0 0
LI L Mozambique 43,56 23 43,59 22 29,64 27 24,00 24 1 -4 -1 -5
LI L Myanmar 42,22 19 42,48 19 24,61 13 17,00 16 0 6 3 6
LI L Nepal 37,43 11 37,56 11 24,23 12 11,33 11 0 -1 0 -1
LI Nicaragua 43,89 24 43,94 24 28,07 22 23,33 22 0 2 2 2
LI L Niger 49,99 37 50,00 36 34,74 38 37,00 37 1 -1 0 -2
LI Nigeria 44,76 26 46,06 27 26,27 17 23,33 22 -1 9 4 10
LI Pakistan 25,73 4 25,93 5 13,48 3 4,00 4 -1 1 0 2
LI Papua New Guinea 44,15 25 44,52 25 29,17 24 24,67 25 0 1 0 1
LI L Rwanda 59,33 49 59,58 47 40,76 43 46,33 45 2 6 4 4
L Samoa 64,65 59 68,57 61 49,84 56 58,67 59 -2 3 0 5
LI L Sao Tome and Principe 58,15 48 65,36 55 43,81 50 51,00 52 -7 -2 -4 5
LI L Senegal 41,80 17 42,00 17 28,02 21 18,33 19 0 -4 -2 -4
LI L Sierra Leone 63,74 56 64,08 52 57,91 62 56,67 57 4 -6 -1 -10
LI L Solomon Islands 56,89 45 61,43 51 44,48 51 49,00 49 -6 -6 -4 0
LI L Somalia 68,40 62 69,24 62 54,27 61 61,67 63 0 1 -1 1
LI L Sudan 49,85 36 51,16 37 29,66 28 33,67 34 -1 8 2 9
LI L Tanzania, United Rep. of 34,12 8 34,26 8 21,60 9 8,33 8 0 -1 0 -1
LI L Timor-Leste 60,84 53 61,14 50 53,05 58 53,67 53 3 -5 0 -8
LI L Togo 45,81 27 45,88 26 29,42 25 26,00 26 1 2 1 1
L Tuvalu 91,85 65 93,33 65 93,29 65 65,00 65 0 0 0 0
LI L Uganda 47,42 32 47,67 30 29,45 26 29,33 28 2 6 4 4
L Vanuatu, Republic of 64,25 58 66,61 58 47,36 54 56,67 57 0 4 1 4
LI Viet Nam 35,74 10 36,95 10 17,16 6 8,67 9 0 4 1 4
LI L Yemen 42,11 18 42,11 18 25,80 16 17,33 18 0 2 0 2
LI L Zambia 46,19 28 46,48 28 32,32 34 30,00 30 0 -6 -2 -6
LI Zimbabwe 47,90 33 48,02 32 30,60 29 31,33 32 1 4 1 3
Averages
50 LDC's 53,33 38,20 54,44 38,18 39,36 38,52 38,30 38,28 1,30 3,96 1,56 4,02
15 other low income 36,99 15,67 37,36 15,73 22,53 14,60 15,33 15,07 0,20 1,87 0,73 1,93
65 49,56 33,00 50,50 33,00 35,48 33,00 33,00 32,92 1,05 3,48 1,37 3,54
Medians
50 LDC's 51,96 40,50 52,98 40,50 38,96 40,50 40,00 40,50 1,00 3,00 1,00 4,00
15 other low income 40,19 13,00 40,37 13,00 24,62 14,00 13,33 13,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00
65 47,90 33,00 48,86 33,00 31,93 33,00 33,00 33,00 1,00 2,00 1,00 3,00
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Table 3: Average and median values of EVI for broad groups and regions, from the 2006 review of the list of the LDCs 
 
EVI, 2006 review Population, 2005 Remoteness  Export concentration shares of agriculture, etc. Specialisation % homeless Agricultural instability Natural Export instability exposure shock 
2003 or latest year 2003 or 2004 index 1990-2004 1979-2004 shock 1979-2004 index index EVI
(Main source: UNCTAD) index trade shock index
values Max-min Indice Max-min values Max-min values Max-min values logs Max-min values Max-min values Max-min
Least developed countries (50)
   average 15 187 782   46,49      0,692  73,57   0,548      52,63           32,62          53,42         53,02              2,20     -0,48 62,86   8,08        35,45      49,16      22,69    54,37   54,89      51,76      53,33      
   median 8 333 340     38,22      0,675  71,84   0,507      47,84           33,44          55,73         49,64              0,54     -0,61 61,42   7,16        30,62      46,98      17,74    46,05   52,80      49,46      51,96      
   
Low income EIT (8)
   average 13 118 982   38,49      0,529  53,67   0,388      33,87           21,24          35,41         34,64              1,05     -1,63 50,59   7,86        34,37      42,48      15,52    39,12   41,32      40,80      41,06      
   median 5 885 387     43,65      0,641  67,59   0,395      34,68           19,80          33,00         38,24              0,88     -0,18 66,08   6,90        29,19      46,91      12,11    28,48   44,02      36,48      43,49      
Other low income (15)
   average 122 947 746 22,95      0,659  69,51   0,360      30,20           21,38          35,64         32,92              1,36     -0,94 57,98   5,18        19,90      38,94      14,16    34,87   37,08      36,90      36,99      
   median 22 112 810   23,21      0,605  63,17   0,251      17,81           21,52          35,87         31,83              0,51     -0,68 60,74   3,73        12,08      37,90      13,84    33,86   38,49      37,77      40,19      
Least developed and other low income (65)
   average 40 055 466   41,06      0,684  72,64   0,504      47,45           30,03          49,31         48,38              2,01     -0,58 61,73   7,41        31,86      46,80      20,72    49,87   50,78      48,33      49,56      
   median 9 402 098     36,36      0,664  70,47   0,459      42,28           27,50          45,83         46,29              0,51     -0,67 60,83   6,48        26,92      44,95      16,09    40,90   49,76      46,03      47,90      
Developing countries excluding EIT (132)
   average 39 078 767   44,82      0,657  69,16   0,441      40,10           19,27          31,75         35,93              1,48     -1,49 52,05   7,65        32,62      42,34      16,89    39,61   48,68      40,97      44,83      
   median 7 376 119     40,10      0,658  69,72   0,400      35,25           14,71          24,52         34,29              0,41     -0,88 58,58   6,53        27,20      41,37      13,48    32,74   47,91      38,04      43,13      
Developing excluding EIT and LDC (82)
   average 53 646 441   43,80      0,636  66,47   0,376      32,46           11,13          18,54         25,50              1,04     -2,11 45,46   7,39        30,90      38,18      13,35    30,61   44,89      34,39      39,64      
   median 6 802 758     41,34      0,649  68,60   0,314      25,14           9,20            15,34         22,12              0,34     -1,09 56,30   5,88        23,66      39,27      11,58    26,81   41,36      32,40      39,10      
SIDS (33)
   average 1 499 803     80,93      0,672  71,52   0,476      44,11           15,66          25,70         34,90              2,30     -1,26 54,58   8,56        37,99      46,28      20,45    44,27   67,07      45,28      56,17      
   median 329 198        87,91      0,651  68,89   0,425      38,18           10,37          17,28         33,73              0,41     -0,89 58,51   8,47        37,67      50,10      14,06    34,55   70,24      42,74      56,49      
Landlocked developing (31) 
   average 12 201 110   39,61      0,764  80,97   0,455      41,73           27,78          46,30         44,01              1,15     -1,88 47,96   8,56        38,15      43,05      17,33    44,24   51,05      43,64      47,35      
   median 8 410 801     38,07      0,766  83,30   0,419      37,52           28,80          48,00         44,63              0,25     -1,40 53,02   7,76        33,86      43,69      14,93    37,27   52,33      40,56      46,68      
EIT low income (8)
   average 13 118 982   38,49      0,529  53,67   0,388      33,87           21,24          35,41         34,64              1,05     -1,63 50,59   7,86        34,37      42,48      15,52    39,12   41,32      40,80      41,06      
   median 5 885 387     43,65      0,641  67,59   0,395      34,68           19,80          33,00         38,24              0,88     -0,18 66,08   6,90        29,19      46,91      12,11    28,48   44,02      36,48      43,49      
African LDC's (34)
   average 13 415 629   42,58      0,688  72,89   0,589      57,51           34,27          55,72         56,62              1,00     -0,92 58,15   8,16        35,98      47,07      20,45    53,93   53,67      50,50      52,08      
   median 8 738 272     37,50      0,661  70,12   0,570      55,25           34,28          57,13         55,12              0,42     -0,87 58,66   7,16        30,62      45,88      17,74    46,05   51,01      48,72      50,26      
Other African countries (18)
   average 24 857 133   36,82      0,600  61,33   0,474      43,73           13,45          22,42         33,07              0,43     -2,55 40,77   7,26        31,15      35,96      13,95    34,21   42,01      35,09      38,55      
   median 14 665 695   29,62      0,619  64,88   0,419      37,54           11,27          18,78         32,53              0,12     -2,13 45,26   6,21        25,45      35,22      14,20    34,99   38,71      34,78      37,76      
All African countries (52)
   average 17 376 150   40,58      0,658  68,89   0,549      52,74           27,07          44,19         48,47              0,80     -1,49 52,13   7,85        34,31      43,22      18,20    47,10   49,63      45,16      47,40      
   median 9 575 515     36,08      0,646  68,31   0,528      50,32           24,40          40,67         46,97              0,30     -1,19 55,29   7,01        29,78      42,91      15,79    39,97   49,78      43,79      46,43      
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Table 4: A retrospective EVI from 1970, for main groups and regions, by decades and five year 
periods 
 
70-79 80-89 90-99 70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90-94 95-99 2000-
Developing countries Moy 5,55 5,19 4,69 5,17 5,57 5,52 4,49 4,45 4,15 3,49
Nbo (75) (86) (105) (77) (80) (88) (100) (107) (111) (114)
Sd 4,04 2,44 4,56 4,59 4,26 2,98 2,39 3,72 5,49 3,83
Median 4,39 4,47 3,96 3,50 4,31 5,10 3,98 3,52 2,79 2,58
LDCs Moy 5,61 5,62 6,03 5,31 6,55 6,24 4,95 5,03 5,83 3,93
Nbo (24) (26) (40) (24) (26) (27) (35) (41) (44) (45)
Sd 2,89 2,87 6,85 3,31 4,65 3,49 2,73 3,81 8,16 3,95
Median 4,77 4,60 4,21 3,92 5,00 5,39 4,19 4,22 3,36 2,79
Non LDCs Moy 5,52 5,01 3,87 5,10 5,09 5,20 4,24 4,10 3,05 3,20
Nbo (51) (60) (65) (53) (54) (61) (65) (66) (67) (69)
Sd 4,51 2,22 1,84 5,09 4,01 2,70 2,17 3,65 1,93 3,76
Median 3,99 4,47 3,50 3,24 3,70 5,10 3,57 3,06 2,62 2,48
SIDs Moy 6,22 5,98 4,22 6,09 7,11 6,72 4,50 4,15 3,38 3,14
Nbo (11) (18) (25) (11) (13) (19) (25) (25) (26) (27)
Sd 3,76 3,15 2,00 4,59 5,72 4,08 2,52 2,15 2,56 2,47
Median 4,55 4,91 3,98 3,93 4,58 6,03 3,42 3,37 3,01 2,79
Non SIDs Moy 5,43 4,99 4,83 5,01 5,27 5,19 4,48 4,55 4,39 3,60
Nbo (64) (68) (80) (66) (67) (69) (75) (82) (85) (87)
Sd 4,11 2,19 5,11 4,60 3,89 2,54 2,36 4,09 6,11 4,17
Median 4,36 4,47 3,80 3,34 4,31 4,90 4,11 3,53 2,76 2,48
LDCs non SIDs Moy 5,25 5,04 6,49 4,90 5,64 5,34 5,00 5,31 6,26 3,97
Nbo (22) (22) (31) (22) (22) (22) (27) (32) (35) (35)
Sd 2,13 2,12 7,63 2,36 3,07 2,31 2,65 4,11 8,96 4,07
Median 4,77 4,41 4,25 3,92 4,72 4,87 4,19 4,23 3,29 2,88
LICs Moy 5,74 5,27 5,65 4,98 5,75 5,72 4,42 4,62 5,54 3,72
Nbo (36) (37) (49) (36) (37) (37) (44) (50) (53) (53)
Sd 2,85 2,38 6,32 3,16 3,21 2,62 2,49 3,63 7,58 3,74
Median 4,95 4,77 4,16 3,88 4,76 5,39 4,12 3,58 3,29 2,71
Non LICs Moy 5,37 5,13 3,84 5,33 5,41 5,38 4,54 4,31 2,88 3,30
Nbo (39) (49) (56) (41) (43) (51) (56) (57) (58) (61)
Sd 4,93 2,50 1,71 5,58 5,02 3,24 2,33 3,83 1,53 3,93
Median 3,45 4,43 3,56 3,24 3,69 5,10 3,85 3,10 2,66 2,51
SIDs non LDCs Moy 5,47 5,16 4,10 5,26 5,13 5,47 4,36 4,22 2,97 2,75
Nbo (9) (14) (16) (9) (9) (14) (17) (16) (17) (17)
Sd 2,53 2,21 1,65 3,30 2,60 2,90 2,25 2,07 1,78 1,35
Median 4,55 4,35 3,87 3,93 4,19 5,17 3,42 3,57 2,62 2,96
SIDs LDCS Moy 9,60 8,82 4,43 9,84 11,57 10,21 4,79 4,03 4,16 3,81
Nbo (2) (4) (9) (2) (4) (5) (8) (9) (9) (10)
Sd 7,88 4,58 2,62 9,48 8,65 5,18 3,18 2,42 3,62 3,69
Median 9,60 8,67 4,09 9,84 9,45 10,14 3,78 3,23 3,38 2,78
LDCs / Non LDCs Wilcoxonn-z -1,27 -0,96 -1,57 -1,61 -2,00 -1,27 -1,20 -1,42 -1,81 -0,85
pvalue-z 0,203 0,335 0,116 0,108 0,046 0,205 0,229 0,157 0,071 0,396
LICs / Non LICs Wilcoxonn-z -2,07 -0,49 -1,36 -1,28 -1,78 -0,96 0,30 -0,28 -1,68 -0,41
pvalue-z 0,038 0,622 0,174 0,202 0,076 0,337 0,765 0,779 0,093 0,685
Wilcoxonn-z -1,13 -1,11 -0,45 -1,10 -1,32 -1,25 0,21 -0,58 0,11 -0,10
SIDs / Non SIDs pvalue-z 0,258 0,265 0,652 0,272 0,186 0,212 0,833 0,561 0,909 0,918
Wilcoxonn-z -0,38 -0,64 0,69 -0,29 -0,27 -0,78 0,92 0,50 0,89 0,43
SIDs / LDCs non SIDs pvalue-z 0,703 0,523 0,489 0,775 0,785 0,433 0,360 0,618 0,374 0,665
Wilcoxonn-z 0,94 1,70 0,17 0,47 1,54 2,04 0,00 -0,40 1,00 0,10
SIDs non LDCs / LDCs pvalue-z 0,346 0,089 0,865 0,637 0,123 0,042 1,000 0,692 0,319 0,920
Wilcoxonn-z 0,04 0,45 0,63 0,02 0,87 0,71 0,79 0,18 1,25 0,43
SIDs non LDCs/SIDs LDCspvalue-z 0,968 0,650 0,526 0,984 0,385 0,475 0,429 0,859 0,213 0,664
Decades Five Years
 
 
 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.07 
32 
 Table 5 Correlation matrix between EVI component indices, from the 2006 Review 
data, 65 LDCs and other low income countries 
 
 
 
 
       
        
        
        
        
        
EVI, 7 components, 
values 
Log 
(pop/1000) remoteness 
export 
concentration 
share of 
agr. in 
gdp 
Log (% 
homeless) 
agr. 
instability 
export 
instability 
log(pop/1000) 1             
remoteness -0,205 1       
export concentration -0,403 -0,119 1      
share of agr. in gdp 0,139 -0,017 0,139 1     
log(% homeless) -0,088 -0,087 -0,041 -0,095 1    
agr. instability -0,372 0,128 0,067 -0,062 0,046 1   
export instability -0,308 0,071 0,178 0,196 -0,066 0,107 1 
        
EVI, 4 components, 
indices population 
location & 
structure natural shock 
trade 
shock     
population 1          
location & structure 0,230 1       
natural shock 0,280 -0,020 1      
trade shock  0,250 0,466 0,133 1    
 
